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I and notes.

Or as is said in Koehler v. Black River Falls Co.,

2 Black 715: "The directors are the trustees or managing partners
and the stockholders are the cestuis que trust * * * of the corporation."
The effect of the decision in the California ease is to have it open
to railroad corporations to make any contract they please, upon any
subject-matter they please, and upon any or no consideration.
It relieves them from all restraints. It completely abrogates the
wholesome doctrine of ultra vire8. If corporations have all the
powers of natural persons in the sense of that decision, then the
object of legislation ought to be to restrict those innate powers,
instead of expressly conferring powers upon the corporation ; thereby
reversing what has heretofore been deemed the law by which the
powers" of corporations are ascertained and determined.
It is insisted that no guaranty by a corporation, as a mere incident to the exercise of its express powers, can be supported on any
consideration, however valuable it may be. So are the decisionsso are the elementary treatises-and such is the reasonable dedue
tion from the nature of those artificial beings, called corporations,
as distinguished from natural persons. The former can legitimately
exercise only those powers -hich the legislature, the author of their
being, has been pleased to confer upon them ; the latter have all
the unrestricted powers with which the Almighty has endowed the
human race.
D.L.

RECENT

AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of the United States.
IRA Y. MUNN

AND

GEORGE L. SCOTT v. TIE PEOPLE OF ILLINOIS.

A state law fixing a maximum charge for the storage of grain in bulk in warehouses within the state, in which the grain of various owners is mixed together,

and the identity of the different lots is destroyed, is not contrary to the Constitution of the United States.

Such a statute is not a regulation of commerce which is prohibited to the states;
nor is it a preference of the ports of one state which is a limitation on the powers
of Congress and does not apply to the regulation by a state of its domestic concerns ; nor is it a depriving of the warehouseman of property without due process
of law within the prohibition of the 14th Amendment.
Statutes regulating the use or even the price of property do not necessarily

deprive the owner of the property within the legal sense of that term.
All property which is affected with a public interest ceases to be jnris privati only
and becomes subject to regulation for the public benefit, and property is affected

MUNN & SCOTT v. THE PEOPLE OF ILLINOIS.
with a public interest whenever it is devoted to such use as to make it of public
consequence and to directly affect the community at large.
Hence the legislative power, both in England and in this country, has always
extended to the regulation of common carriers, innkeepers, ferrymen, warehousemen and others in similar employments of public interest ; and the question
of what is a reasonable charge by such persons for their services or the use of their
property, has from time immemorial been deemed, in common-law countries, a
legislative and not a judicial question.
A storage place for grain in bulk, such as is described in the statute above
referred to, is a warehouse within these rules of the common law. -

IN error to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois. The case
is sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court, which was delivered by
WAITE, C. J.-The question to be determined in this case is,
whether the General Assembly of Illinois can, under the limitations
upon the legislative power of the states, imposed by the Constitution
of the United States, fix by law the maximum of charges for the
storage of grain in warehouses at Chicago and other places in the
state having not less than one hundred thousand inhabitants, "in
which grain is stored in bulk, and in which the grain of different
owners is mixed together, or in which grain is stored in such a manner that the identity of different lots or parcels cannot be accurately
preserved."
It is claimed that such a law is repugnant1. To that part of sect. 8, art.1, of the Constitution of the United
States, which confers upon Congress the power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states ;"
2. To that part of sect. 9 of the same article which provides that
"no preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one state over those of another ;" and3. To that part of Amendment 14, which ordains that no state
shall "1deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."
We will consider the last of these objections first.
Every statute is presumed to be constitutional. The courts ought
not to declare one to be unconstitutional unless it is clearly so. If
there is doubt the expressed will of the legislature should be sustained.
The Constitution contains no definition of the word "deprive" as
used in the fourteenth amendment. To determine its signification,
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therefore, it is necessary to ascertain the effect which usage has giverL
it when employed in the same or a like connection.
While this provision of the aiendmient is new in the Constitution
of the United States, as a limitation upon the powers of the states,
it is old as a principle of civilized government. It is found in X agna
Charta, and, in substance if not in form, in nearly or quite all the
constitutions that have been, from time to time, adopted by the several states of the Union. By the fifth anicudment it was introduced
into the Constitution of the United States as a limitation upon the
powers of the national government, and by the fourteenth as a guaranty against any encroachment upon an acknowledged right of citizenship by the legislature of the states.
When the people of the United Colonies separated from Great
Britain they changed the form but not the substance of their government. They retained for the purposes of government all the powers
of the British Parliament, and, through their state constitutions or
other forms of social compact, undertook to give practical effect to such
as they deemed necessary for the common good hnd the security of
life and property. All the powers which they retained they committed
to their respective states, unless in express terms or by implication
reserved to themselves. Subsequently, when it was found necessary
to establish a national government for national purposes, a part of
the powers of the states and of the people of the states was granted
to the United States and the people of the United States. This
grant operated as a further limitation upon the powers of the states,
so that now the governments of the states possess all the powers of
the Parliament of England except such as have been delegated to
the United States or reserved by the people. The reservations by
the people are shown in the prohibitions of the constitutions.
When one becomes a member of society lie necessarily parts with
some rights or privileges which, as an individual not affected by his
relations to others, lie might retain. "A body politic," as aptly
defined in the 1preamble of the constitution of Massachusetts, "is a
social compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good." This does not confer
power upon the whole people to control rights which are purely and
exclusively private ('lTre v. R. J. B. Railroad b., 27 Vt. 148),
but it does authorize the establishment of laws requiring each citizen to so conduct himself and so use his own property as not unne-
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cessarily to injure another. This is the very essence of government,
and has found expression in the maxim sic etre tuo ut alienum
von laedas. From this source come the police powers, which, as
was said by Chief Justice TANrEY in the License Cases, 5 How.
583, "are nothing more or less than the powers of government
inherent in every" sovereignty, * * * that is to say, * * * the
power to govern men and things." Under these powers the government regulates tie conduct of its citizens one towards another, and
the manner in which each shall use his own property, when such
regulation becomes necessary for the public good. In their exercise
it has been customary in England from time immemorial, and in
this country from its first colonization, to regulate ferries, common
carriers, hackmen, bakers, millers, wharfingers, innkeepers, &c.,
and in so doing to fix a maximum of charge to be made for services
rendered, accommodations furnished, and articles sold. To this
day statutes are to be found in many of the states upon some or all
these subjects, and we think it has never yet been successfily contended that such legislation came within any of the constitutional
prohibitions against interference with private property.. With the
fifth amendment in force, Congress, in 1820, conferred power upon
the city~ of Washington "to regulate * * * the rates of wharfage
at private wharves, * * * the sweeping of chimneys, and to fix the
rates of fees therefor, * * * and the weight and quality of bl, ad"
(3 stat. 587, sect. 7) ; and in 1848, "to make all necessary regulations respecting hackney carriages and the rates of fare of the same,
and the rates of hauling by cartmen, waggoners, carmen, and draymen, and the rates of commission of auctioneers" (9 stat. 224,
sect. 2).
From this it is apparent that down to the time of the adoption of
the fourteenth amendment it was not supposed that statutes regulating the use or even the price of the use of private property necessarily
deprived an owner of his property without due process of law. Under
some circumstances they may, but not under all. The amendment
does not change the law in this particular; it simply prevents the
states from doing that which will operate as such a deprivation.
This brings us to inquire as to the principles upon which this
power of regulation rests, in order that we may determine what is
within and what without its operative effect. Looking, then, to the
common law, from whence came the right which the constitution
VOL. XXV.-67
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protcets, we find that when private property is " affected with a
public interest it ceases to be juris p)rivati only." This was said by
Lord Chief Justice HALE, more than two hundred years ago, in his
Treatise " De Portibus Maris" (1 Ilarg. Law Tracts 78), and has
been accepted without objection as an essential element in the law
of property ever since. Property does become clothed with a public
interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence
and affect the comnmnity at large. When, therefore, one devotes
his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he in effect
grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be
controlled by the public for the common good to the extent of the
interest ie has thus created. Ile may withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use, but so long as he maintains the use lie must
submit to the control.
Thus, as to ferries, Lord IIALE says, in his Treatise "De jure
Maris" (1 Ilarg. Law Tracts 6), the king has "a right of franchise
or privilege, that no man may set up a common ferry for all passengers, without a prescription time out of mind, or a charter from
the king. Jlie may make a ferry for his own use or the use of his
family, but not for the common use of all the king's subjects passing
that way; because it doth in consequent tend to a common charge,
and is become a thing of public interest and use, and every man
for his passage pays a toll, which is a common charge, and every
ferry ought to be under a public regulation, viz., that it give attendance at due times, keep a boat in due order, and take but reasonable toll; for if he fail in these he is fineable." So if one owns
the soil and landing places on both banks of a stream he cannot use
them for the purposes of a public ferry, except upon such terms and
conditions as the body politic may from time to time impose, and
this because the common good requires that all public ways shall be
under the control of the public authorities. This privilege or prerogative of the king, who in this connection only represents and
gives another name to the body politic, is not primarily for his
profit, but for the protection of the people and the promotion of the
general welfare.
And again, as to wharves and wharfingers, Lord HALE, in his
Treatise "De Portibus Maris," already cited, says: "A man, for
his own private advantage, may, in a port or town, set up a harf
or crane, and may take what rates lie and his customers can agree
for cranagc, wharfage, housellage, pesage; for he doth no more
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than is lawful for any man to do, viz., makes the most of his own.
* * * If the king or subject have a public wharf, unto which all
persons that come to that port must come and unlade or lade their
goods as for the purpose, because thlcy are the wharves only licensed
by the queen, * * * or because there is no other wharf in that
port, as it may fall out where a port is newly erected ; in that case
there cannot be taken arbitrary and excessive duties for cranage,
wharfage, pesage, &c., neither can they be enhanced to an immoderate rate, but the duties must be reasonable and moderate, though
settled by the king's license or charter. For now the wharf and
crane.and other conveniences are affected with a public interest,
and they cease to be juris primati only ; as if a man set out a street
in new building on his own land, it is now no longer bare private
interest, but is affected by a public interest." This statement of
the law by Lord HALE was cited with approbation, and acted upon
by Lord KENYON, at the beginning of the present century, in Bolt
v. Stennett, 8 T. R. 606.
And the same has beeh held as to warehouses and warehousemen.
In Aldnutt v. Inglis, 12 East 527, decided in 1810, it appeared
that the London Dock Company had built warehouses in which
wines were taken in store at such rates of charge as the company
and owners might agree tipon. Afterwards, the company obtained
authority under the general warehousing act,'to receive wines from
the importers before the duties-upon the importation were paid, and
the question was whether they could charge arbitraly rates for such
storage or must be content with a reasonable compensation. Upon

this point Lord

ELLENBOROUGH

said (p. 537) : " There is no doubt

that the general principle is favored both in law and justice, that
every man may fix what price he pleases, upon his own property,
or the use of it ; but if, for a particular purpose, the public have a
right to resort to his premises and make use of them, and he have
a monopoly in them for that purpose, if he will take tie benefit of
that monopoly, he must, as an equivalent, perform the duty attached
to it on reasonable terms. The question then is, whether, circumstanced as this company is by the combination of the warehousing
act with the act by which they were originally constituted, and with
the actually existing state of things in the port of London, whereby
they alone have the warehousing of these wines, they be not. according to the doctrine of Lord ILE, oblige(d to limit themselves to a
reasonable compensation for *uch warehousing. And according to
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the accident of time casts upon a party the benefit
fl],eiever
him,
of having a legal monopoly of landing goods in a public port, as
-where he is the owner of the only wharf authorized to receive goods
which happens to be built in a port newly erected, he is confined to
take reasonable compensation only for the use of the wharf." And
further on (p. 539) : "It is enough that there exists in the place
and for the commodity in question, a virtual monopoly of the warehousing for this purpose, on which the principle of law attaches as
laid down by Lord hIALE in the passage referred to (that from
'De Portibus Maris,' already quoted), which includes the good
sense as well as the law of the subject." And in the same case,
Li, BLANC, J., said (p. 541): "Then, admitting these warehouses
to be private property, and that the company might discontinue
this application of them, or that they might have made what terms
they pleased in the first instance, Yet having as they now have this
monopoly, the question is, whetier the warehouses be not private
property clothed with a public right, and if so, the principle of
law attaches upon them. The privilege, then, of bonding these
wines being at present confined by the Act of Parliament to the
company's warehouses, is it not the privilege of the public, and
shall not that which is for the good of the public attach on the
monopoly, that they shall not be bound to pay an arbitrary but a
reasonable rent ? But upon this record the company resist having
their demand for warehouse rent confined within any limit, and
though it does not follow that the rent in fact fixed by them is unreasonable, they do not choose to insist on its being reasonable for
the purpose of raising the question. For this purpose, therefore,
the question may be taken to be, whether they may claim an unreasonable rent. But, though this be private property, yet the principle
laid down by Lord HALE attaches upon it, that when private property is affected with a public interest it ceases to be juris privati
only; and in case of its dedication to such a purpose as this, the
owners cannot take arbitrary and excessive duties, but the duties
must be reasonable."
We have quoted thus largely the words of these eminent expounders of the common law, because, -swe think, we find in them
the principle which supports the legislation we are now examining.
Of Lord HALE it was once said by a learned American judge : "In

England, even on rights of prerogative, they scan his words with as
much care as if they had been found in Magna Charta, and the
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meaning once ascertained, they do not trouble themsclvcs to search
any further:" 6 Cowen 536, note.
In later times the same principle came under consideration in
the Supreme Court of Alabama. That court was called upon, in
1841, to decide whether the power granted to the city of Mobile to
regulate the weight and price of bread was unconstitutional, and it
was contended that "i. would interfere with the right of the citizen
to pursue his lawful trade or calling in the mode his judgment
might dictate," but the court said, "there is no motive * ** for
this interference on the part of the legislature with the lawful
actions of individuals or the mode in which private property shall
be enjoyed, unless such calling affects the public interest, or private
property is employed in a manner which directly affects the body
of the people. Upon this principle, in this state tavern-keepers are
licensed; * * * and the county court is required at least once a
year to settle the rates of innkeepers. Upon the same principle is
founded the control which the legislature has always exercised in
the establishment and regulation of mills, ferries, bridges, turnpike
roads, and other kindred subjects :" lJ3obile v. litlle, 3 Ala. N.
S. 140.
From the same source comes the power to regulate the charges
of common carriers, which was done in England as long ago as the
third year of the reign of William and Mary and continued until
within a comparatively recent period. And in the first statute we
-find the following suggestive preamble, to wit: "And whereas divers
wagoners and other carriers, by combination amongst themselves,
have raised the prices of carriage of goods, in many places to excessive rates, to the great injury of the trade : Be it, therefore, enacted," &c.: 3 W. & Al., ch. 12, sect. 24, 3 Stat. at Large (Great
Britain) 481. Common carriers exercise a sort of public office and
have duties to perform in which the public is interested: New Jer8ey .av. Co. v. .ferchants' Bank, 6 How. 382. Their business
is, therefore, "affected with a public interest" within the meaning
of the doctrine which Lord IIALE has so forcibly stated.
But we need not go further. Enough has already been said to
show that when private property is devoted to a public use it is subject to public regulation. It remains only to ascertain whether the
warehouses of these plaintiffs in error and the business which is carried on there come within the operation of this principle.
For this purpose we accept as true the statements of fact con-
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taincd in the elaborate brief of one of the counsel of the plaintiffs
in error. From these it appears that "the great producing region
of the west and northwest sends its grain by water and rail to Chicago, where the greater part of it is shipped by vessel for transportation to the seaboard, by the great lakes, and some of it is forwarded
by railway to the eastern ports. * * * Vessels, to some extent,
are loaded in the Chicago harbor and sailed through the St. Lawrence directly to Europe. * * * The quantity (of grain) received
in Chicago has nadc it the greatest grain market in the world.
This business has created a demand for means by which the immense quantity of grain can be handled or stored, and these have
been found in grain warehouses, which are commonly called elevators, because the grain is elevated from the boat or car, by machinery
operated by steam, into the bins prepared for its reception; and
elerated from the bins, by a like process, into the vessel or car
which is to carry it on. * * * In this way the largest traffic between the citizens of the country north and west of Chicago, and
the citizens of the country lying on the Atlantic coast north of
Washington, is in grain which passes through the elevators of Chicago. In this way the trade in grain is carried on by the inhabitants of seven or eight of the great states of the west with four or
five of the states lying on the seashore, and forms the largest
part of inter-state, commerce in these states. The grain warehouses
or elevators in Chicago axe immense structures, holding from three
hundred thousand to one million bushels at one time, according to
size. They are divided into bins of large capacity and gredt
strength. * * * They are located with the river harbor on one side
and the railway tracks on the other, and the grain is run through
them from car to vessel, or boat to car, as may be demanded in the
course of business. It has been found impossible to preserve each
owner's grain separate, and this has given rise to a system of inspection and grading, by which the grain of different owners is mixed,
and receipts issued for the number of bushels which are negotiable,
and redeemable in like kind, upon demand. This mode of conducting the business was inaugurated more than twenty years ago and
has grown to immense proportions. The railways have found it
impracticable to own such elevators, and public policy forbids the
transaction of such business by the carrier; the ownership has,
therefore, been by private individuals, who have embarked their
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capital and devoted their industry to such business as a private
pursuit."
In this connection it must also be borne in mind that although
in 1874 there were in Chfcago fourteen. warehouses adapted to this
particular business and owned by about thirty persons, nine business
firms controlled them, and that the prices charged and received for
storage were such "1as have been fiom year to year agreed upon and
established by the different elevators or warehouses in the city of
Chicago, and which rates have been annually published in one or
more newspapers printed in said city, in the month of January in
each year, as the established rates for the yeti" then next ensuing
such publication." Thus it is apparent that all the elevating facilities through which these vast productions "of seven or eight great
states of the west" must pass on the way "to four or five of the
states on the seashore," may be a "virtual" monopoly.
Under such circumstances it is difficult to see why, if the common
carrier, or the miller, or the ferryman, or the innkeeper, or the
wharfinger, or the baker, or the cartman, or the hackney-coachman
pursues a public employment and exercises "a sort of public office,"
these plaintiffs in error do not. They stand, to use again the
language of their counsel, in the very "gateway of commerce," and
take toll from all who pass. Their business most certainly "tends
to a common charge, and is become a thing of public interest and
use." Every bushel of grain for its passage "pays a toll, which is
a common charge," and, therefore, according to Lord IIALE, every
such warehouseman "ought to be under public regulation, viz.,
that he * * * take but reasonable toll." Certainly if any business
can be clothed "with a public interest and cease to be juris privati
only," this has been. It may not be made so by the operation of
the constitution of Illinois or this statute, but it is by the facts.
We also are not permitted to overlook the fact that, for some
reason, the people of Illinois, when they revised their constitution
in 1870, saw fit to make it the duty of the General Assembly to
pass laws "for the protection of producers, shippers, and receivers
of grain and produce" (art. 13, sect. 7), and by sect. 5 of the
same article to require all railroad companies receiving and transporting grain in bulk or otherwise to deliver the same at any elevator
to which it might be consigned, that could be reached by any track
that was or could be used by such company, and that all railroad
companies should permit connections to be made with their tracks,
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so that any public warehouse, &c., might be reached by the cars on
their railroads. This indicates very clearly that during the twenty
years in which this peculiar business had been assuming its present
"immense proportions," something had occurred which led the
whole body of the people to suppose that remedies such as are usually
employed to prevent abuses by virtual monopolies might not be
inappropriate here. For our purposes we must assume that if a
state of facts could exist that would justify such legislation, it
actually did exist when the statute now under consideration was
passed. For us the question is one of power, not of expediency.
If no state of circumstances could exist to justify such a statute,
then we may declare this one void, bccause in excess of the legislative
power of the state. But if it could, we must presume it did. Of
the propriety of legislative interference within the scope of legislative
power the legislature is the exclusive judge.
Neither is it a matter of any moment that no precedent can be
found for a statute precisely like this. It is conceded that the
business is one of recent origin; that its growth has been rapid, and
that it is already of great importance. And it must also be conceded
that it is a business in which the whole public has a direct and
positive interest. It presents, therefore, a case for the application
of a long known and well-established principle in social science, and
this statute simply extends the law so as to meet this new development qf commercial progress. There is no attempt to compel these
owners to grant the public an interest in their property, but to
declare their obligations if they use it in this particular manner.
It matters not in this case that these plaintiffs in error had built
their warehouses and established their business before the regulations complained of were adopted. What they did was from the
beginning subject to the power of the body politic to require them
to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper
authorities for the common good. They entered upon their business
and provided themselves with means to carry it on subject to this
condition. If they did not wish to submit themselves to such interference, they should not have clothed the public with an interest in
their concerns. The same principle applies to them that does to the
proprietor of a hackney carriage, and as to him it has never been
supposed that hie was exempt from regulating statutes or ordinances
because he had purchased his horses and carriage and established
his business before the statute or the ordinance was adopted.
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It is insistcd, however, that the owner of property is entitled to
a reasonalble compensation for its use, eveft though it be clothed with
a public interest, and that what is reasonable is a judicial and not a
legislative question.
A-- has already been shown, the practice has been otherwise. In
countries where the common law prevails, it has been customary
from time immemorial for the legislature to declare what shall be a
reasonable compensation under such circumstances, or, perhaps more
properly speaking, to fix a maximum beyond which any charge made
would be unreasonable. Undoubtedly in mere private contracts,
relating to matters in which the public has no interest, what is reasonable must be ascertained judicially. But this is because the legislature has no control over such a contract. So, too, in matters
which do affect the public interest, and as to which legislative control
may be exercised, if there are no statutory regulations upon the subject, the courts must determine what is reasonable. The controlling fact is the power to regulate at all. If that exist, the rightto
establish the maximum of charge, as one of the means of regulation, is implied. In fact, the common-law rule, which requires
the charge to be reasonable, is itself a regulation as to price. Without it the owner could make his rates at will and compel the public
to yield to his terms or forego the use.
But a mere common-law regulation of trade or business may be
changed by statute. A person has no property, no vested interest
in any rule of the common law. That is only one of the forms of
municipal law, and is no more sacred than any other. Rights of
property which have been created by the common law cannot be
taken away without due process, but the law itself as a rule of conduct may be changed at the Will or even at the whim of the legislature, unless prevented by constitutional limitations. Indeed, the
great office of statutes is to remedy defects in the common law as they
are developed, and to adapt it to the changes of time and circumstances. To limit the rate of charge for services rendered in a public
employment, or for the use of property in which the public has an
interest, is only changing a regulation which existed before. It
establishes no new principle in the law, but only gives a new effect to
an old one.
We know that this is a power which may be abused, but that is
no argument against its existence. For protection against abuses
by legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts.
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After what has already been said it is unnecessary to refer at
length to the effect of the other provision of the fourteenth amendment which is relied upon, viz., that no state shall "deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Certainly it cannot be claimed that this prevents the state from regulating the fares of hackmen or the charges of drayien in Chicago,
unless it does the same thing in every other place within its jurisdiction. But, as has been seen, the power to regulate the business
of warehouses depends upon the same principle as the power to regulate hackmen and draymen, and what cannot be done i the one
case in this particular cannot be done in the other.
We come now to consider the effect upon this statute of the power
of Congress to regulate commerce.
It was very properly said in the case of the State Tax on Btailway
Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 298, that "it is not everything that affects
commerce that amounts to a regulation of it, within the meaning
of the constitution." The warehouses of these plaintiffs in error
are situated and their business carried on exclusively within the
limits of the state of Illinois. They are used as instruments by
those engaged in state as well as those engaged in inter-state
commerce, but they a:c no more necessarily a part of commerce
itself than the dray or the cart by which, but for them, grain would
be transferred from one railroad station to another. Incidentally
they may become connected with inter-state commerce, but not
necessarily so. Their regulation is a thing of domestic concern,
and certainly until Congress acts in reference to their inter-state
relations the state may exercise all the powers of government over
them, even though in so doing it may. indii'ectly operate upon commerce outside its immediate jurisdiction. We do not say that a
case may not arise in which it will be found that a state, under the
form of regulating its own affairs, has encroached upon the exclusive
domain of Congress in respect to inter-state commerce, but we do
say, that upon the facts as they are presented to us in this record,
that has not been done.
The remaining objection, to wit, that the statute in its present
form is repugnant to sect. 9, art. 1, of the Constitution of the
United States, because it gives preference to the ports of one state
over those of another, may be disposed of by the single remark that
this provision operates only as a limitation of the powers of Congress,
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andI in no respect affects the states in the regulation of their domestic
affairs.
We conclude, therefore, that the statute in question is not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and that there is no
error in the judgment. In passing upon this case we have not
been umnindful of the vast importance of the questions involved.
This and cases of a kindred character were argued before us more
titan a year ago by the most eminent counsel, and in a manner
worthy of their well-earned reputations. We have kept the cases
long under advisement, in order that their decision might be the
result of our mature deliberations.
The judgment is affirmed.
The questions which arise upon the
foregoing opinion and upon the decision
of the court in this case, are at once
important, delicate and difficult.
It
would be far easier, either to attack the
opinion or to defend it, than to elucidate
satisfactorily the subject to which it
relates. To say that the opinion performs the last service, would be to
praise it incorrectly. It is an able
defence of the conclusion to which the
court had come ; not a review of the
grounds which might be urged against
as well as for it.
It finds that it is within the scope of
the ordinary legislative powers of a
state legislature, to fix a rate, or schedule of rates, at which any person, firm
or corporation, which chooses to render
to any other person, firm or corporation the service of storing grain in
bulk, mixing the grain of different
owners, shall charge for such service.
The fact that the decision applies, in
the first instance, to a case where the
grain of various owners is mixed and
stored in bulk, seems to result as a mere
incident from the language of the statute.
For aught that appears, this
point is as irrelevant to the decision, as
the other incident of the statute out of
which the case arises, viz., that tie
storage shall occur in a ,' place.in Illinois, having not less than one hundred

thousand inhabitants," i. e., in the city
of Chicago. None of the authorities
cited in support of the opinion involve
the blending of the property of different
owners;, and we shall defer therefore,
for the present. the question whether
the public acquire any additional legal
interest in the storage of grain, by
reason of the grain of different owners
being blended, stored in hulk, and redelivered according to grade, after the
manner of the Roman contract of
muluum.
Stripped of these superfluities, the
question is whether it is within the
scope of the legislative power to provide
that A. shall charge B. for storing
grain a specified price, -say (to pursue
the language of the statute of Illinois)
" two cents per bushel, and no more,
for the first thirty days, and for every
fifteen days thereafter one half of one
cent per bushel."
It is to be remembered that B., the
warehouseman, enjoys no franchise, as
does a railroad company; has no legal
monopoly, as had the London Dock
Company, in Aldnutt v. Tag'is, 12 East
527; is liable to competition from
whomsoever chooses to invest his capital in storing grain ; that no navigable
waters are appropriated to his private
use, as in the case of wharf owners;
that no exercise of the right of eminent

540

MUNN & SCOTT r. TIlE PEOPIE OF ILLiNOIS.

domain is put forth in his behalf by the
state, to enable him to build his warehouse, as in the case of canals and railroad companies ; that no improved
track is furnished at public cost for his
use, as in the case of cabmen ; that no
right arises by prescription or otherwise, as in the case of ferrymen at
common law, to restrain a rival from
entering into the same business; and
that he is not even incorporated.
The court does not make its decision,
in favor of the existence of this power
in the legislature of Illinois, to turn
upon any clause in the state constitution conferring it. That constitution
(of 1870), it may be remarbed, invests the legislature with power to prevent extortion in "rates of freight and
passenger tariffs on railroads," but in
a long and elaborate article on "warehouses" omits to confer on the General
Assembly any right to prescribe rates
for storing grain.
The court derive the alleged power
from the fact, as they state, that the
"cproperty" of the warehouseman (i. e.,
we presume, his warehouse, scales, connecting tracks, elevators, bank account
and the labor of his servants) is "taffected with a public interest, and ceases
to be jaris prirati only." The court
nowhere defines the term "1affected with
a public interest," except by using
terms equally undefined. It says, "property does become clothed with a public
interest when used in a manner to make
it of public consequence and affect the
community at large." The vast private
fortunes of A. T. Stewart and of the
Harper Brothers were used in a manner to make them of great public consequence, and to affect the community
at large. Mr. Stewart did much to
cheapen goods to the consumers thereof,
to lessen the percentage of lies told
by clerks and salesmen to the number
of yards of goods sold, to extend
the consumption and production of

goadq, &e. The llarpers nine their
private fortunes "of great public con-

sequence" in other ways. But it would
not be contended that a state legislature
had power to prescribe the rates at
which Mr. Stewart should sell his muslins, or the IHarpers their spellingbooks. And yet, in the estinqation of
many people, either of these questions
might be of as much public cousequence and might affect the community
at large as mueh as the question how
much Munn & Scott should charge for
storing grain.
Is property said to be Ccaffected with
a public interest' only when the puldic
have a proprietary interest in it as part
owners? or is it equally " affected with
a public interest" when the public are
only interested as purchasers in buA ing
it as cheaply as possible ? In which
sense did Lord Chief Justice IIALF. use

these words in the two tracts cited,
"l)e Portibus MAlarns," and " l)e Jure
Maris ?" In the latter sense all property is "affected with a public interest." In the former sense a grain
elevator would he no more "affected
with a public interest ' than a grain
farm or a book-store. The public has
a proprietary interest as part owner in
a ferry, for it owns the stream over
which the ferry is established. It is in
this connection that Lord IlAi.F, in De
Jure Maris, c. 3, says, "There be
some streams, or rivers, that are private
not only in propriety or ownership, but
also in use, as little streams br rivers
that are not a common passage for the
king's people. Again there be other
rivers, as well fresh as salt, that are of
common or public use for carriage of
boats or lighters. And these, whether
they are fresh or salt, whether they
flow and reflow or not, are prinaJfucie
publicijuris,common highways for man
or goods or both, from one inland town
to another."
"1But if any person, at
his own charge, makes his own private
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stream to he passable for bonts or
hargeQ, either ir maiking of lock't or
cuti, or drawing together other streams,
and hereby that river which was his
own ii point of propriety, become now
capable of carriadc of vessels, yet this
seemi not to make it juris publici, and
lie may pull it down again, or apply it
to his own private use ; for it is not
hereby made to be jurs publlici, unless
it were done at a common charge, or
by public authority, or that by long
continuance of time it hath been freely
devoted to a public use."
These extracts sufficiently show that
the mode in which a ferry became
" affected with a public interest" was
through the ownership by the public of
the stream over %hich the ferry crossed,
and not merely through the pecuniary
interest the public had, as travellers, in
low rates of ferriage.
Again, Lord IIAL says: "For no
man can take a settled or constant toll
even in his own private land, for a
common passage, without the king's
license." The reason for this we assume
to be, that the act of taking a constant
toll for a common passage over his
land dedicated it to the public, i. c.,
gave the public an casement over it;
"as if a man set out a street in new
building on his own land; it is no
longer bare private interest, but is affected by a public interest."
What is meant by the phrase "affected by a public interest" may well
be interpreted in the light of the meantig attached to essentially the same
phrase, as it has descended to us, in the
law of evidence, from a like early
period. It is a familiar rule of evidence that hearsay testimony is admis"
sible in matters of public and general
interest." Now, in one sense, nothing
can be of more public and general
interest than a murder ; but this would
not be suggested as a reason why the
facts of the murder should be proved
by hearsay. Every case in which hear-

say has heen admitted because the matter was "of public atd general interest,"
will be found to be one in which the
public, or some considerable part
thereof, have a proprietary interest as
part owners, inlands, messuages, ways,
commons, fisheries or the like: Vide
I Greenleaf'.s Ev., ch. 4, p. 151 to 162.
Is it possible that Mr. Chief Justice
WAIT. has held that grain warehouses
are "affected witlra public interest"
without stopping to define in his own
mind the very ancient and indefinite
phrase which he makes the basis of conferring on a state legislature a power
which its constitutional convention has
declined to confer in plain terms ? And
yet it would devolve upon the learned
Chief Justice, if he had clearly defined
this phrase in his own mind andthad
concluded that the public have a proprietary interest as part owners in all
grain warchouses, to point out what
part of the warehouse the public owns.
A ferry is juris publici because the public owns the stream. A stage route or
car route or hack route is jurispublici,
partly because the public owns and
keeps in repair the travelled way over
which the route lies, and partly because,
where these licenses are granted at all,
they are protected as a legislative monopoly. But so far from a warehouseman in Chicago having a legal monopoly, statutes are enacted to prevent
him from acquiring a monopoly, by
requiring that all railroads shall permit
connecting tracks to be laid to any and
all elevators, and shall permit any consignee to change the destination of his
grain at any moment before delivery,
and to take it from the car on the track
without the intervention of an elevator,
if he prefers.
We presume it is not contended by
anybody that the public has the least
proprietary interest in, or title to, or
easement over the property of the warehouseman, such as it has in a street or
navigable stream. At least no writer
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or jurist has attempted to define what
part or how much of an elevator is
public property ; whether it is the grain
buckets, the bius, the roof that shelters
them, the ground on which the elevator
is built, or the money in the drawer.
Hence we conclude that where Chief
Justice WAITE asserts that the warehouses are private property affected
with a public interest, he does not use
the terms in the qame sense as that
which applies to them in the law of
evidence, or as that which seems to be
applied to them by Lord HALE, Viz.,
that the public, or some considerable
portion thereof, are part owners in the
warehouses themselves. Having rejected the theory that he intends a proprietary interest, we are free to regard
the "interest" which the public have
in them as being pecuniary or nonpecuniary, social, moral, intellectual,
or zesthetic ; indeed the same that the
public have in all other varieties of
private property. We are the more
constrained to* adopt this view, since
the Chief Justice cites in support of his
theory numerous cases in which the
public have no proprietary interest.
In The Mayor and Aldermen of Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. (N. S.) 137, a
bakerwas fined, under a city ordinance
regulating the weight and price of
bread, because of his bread not being
of full weight. In order to involve the
question here involved, viz., that of the
power of the legislature to compel a
vendor to sell a given article at a fixed
price, the prosecution should have been
for selling bread of the proper weight
for a higher price than that named in
the mayor's proclamation. The power
to prescribe that loaves of bread shall
be made up for sale of a given weight,
is one mode of exercising the power of
regulating weights and measures, and
is an undoubted element of the police
power quite distinct from the power to
prescribe prices for goods or services.
We will not review the cases cited to

show that legislatures may prescribe
rates of freight and fare for common
carriers. They differ essentially in the
fact that common carriers are all engaged in the use of either public property, or of some way which has been
condemned by the exercise of the right
of eminent domain. Persons cannot derive their occupation from the use of
public property without being affected
by a public interest. But it may be
urged if the use ofea public highway, by
a common carrier, is what causes his
occupation to be so "affected by a public
interest" as to justify the public in
regulating his rates of charge, then the
use of the same highway by a private
or special carrier should have the same
effect.
Very likely I The business of
private carriers is of so little consequence
that the public have never seen fit to
regulate their charges, but the public
probably has the right to say on what
terms its own highways shall be used,
since it may levy a toll on their use or
close them altogether. We do not deny
that the motive for regulating the charges
of common carriers is a police motive,
s. e., to prevent petty frauds and impositions on strangers by persons who are
practically compelled to pursue a given
route and have no choice. But it does
not follow that the motive, and the
right to do so, have their origin in the
same facts.
The gravest question involved in this
theory is not argued or met in Mr.
Chief Justice WAITE'S opinion. It is
the same upon which Mr. Webster
dwelt with greatest force in the argument of the case of the Dartmoulh Cdlege v. Woodward. Is there any difference in principle between taking the
property of Dartmouth College from
its trustees without their consent, and
giving in payment such interest as the
state legislature chose to dole out to
them in the proposed University of
Dartmouth, and taking grain storage
from a warehouseman for which lie
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declines to take less than two and a
half cents per bushel and tendering
him the two cents per bushel, or the
one mill per bushel which the legislature may deign to provide ? Is there
any difference in ptinciple between taking property and paying for it less than
its owner asks, and taking it without
payment ? If it is competent and constitutional to provide that no warehouseman shall receive more than tvo cents
per bushel, is it not equally constitutional to provide that he should not
receive more than two mills? Any
other rule wouhl make the constitutional power of a legislature to pass a
law depend on the wisdom and expediency of the law they pass, and would
make the court to sit in review of the
legislature on the question of the expediency of the mode in which they had
acted, as the means of finding out
whether they had any power to act!
The free ju disponendi, if not inseparable from the meaning of the word
property, is at least an important part
of the value of most property, and
should not be taken for public use
without payment, nor for private use
even on payment being made. If the
public can say how much an elevator
can charge for storage, then the public
have the jus disponendi, and the property in the elevator is theirs. If the
public acquired the right by legislative
enactment, such act was confiscation.
In the language of Mr. Webster in
the Aiartnouth College case, "these
acts are not the exerci.e of a power
properly legislative. Their object and
effect is to take away from one rights,
property and franchises, and grant them
to another."
We would not overlook the fact that
it is not easy, in all cases, to draw the
line of distinction between the power
of the legislature to fix the rates, or to
authorize county courts or justices of
the peace to fix the rates of charges to
be.made by innkeepers, millers, Uakers

and the like, and the power asserted by
the legislature of Illinois in this instance. Such laws are adapted to a
simple and somewhat despotic state of
society, and deserve to be classed
with laws to compel the burial of the
dead in woollen, in order to promote
the woollen manufacture, or with laws
to prevent the driving of four-whecled
carriage with liveried footmen, or the
wearing of jewelry.
As to mills, the fact that they were
usually run with the power of streams
whose flow was obstructed by their
dams; that generally they overflowed
or spoiled the lands of numerous adjoining owners, and that the inhabitants
of the manors surrounding them became by custom legally bound to grind
at certain mills, so that an action would
lie by the mill owner against the recusant farmer, if lie ground elsewhere
(15 Viner's Abr. 398; Hix v. Gardnzer,
Bulstrode 195), may have concurred in
causing the mill to be "private property affected with a public interest." In
such a mill two elements of "public
interest" would combine, viz., a virtual
though not technical exercise of eminent domain in obtaining the waterpower, and a monopoly of the privilege
of grinding for the tenants of a particular manor.
In the ease of innkeepers, the regulations seem to have been classed under
the police power, to prevent extortions
and the petty cheating of strangers by
hosts who would never expect to entertain a particular guest a second time,
and therefore had no sufficient inducement to be reasonable.
In the case of bakers, some of the
legislation has been sufficiently ignorant in its conception, and ineffectual
in its result, to suggest that it may not
have been consistent always with rights
of property or with the principles of
constitutional law.
If the Supreme
Court of the United States really thinks
that it is competent for any of our
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state legislatures to prescribe the rates
at which guests shall be boarded in all
the hotels within the state, and to make
the rate the same at our most luxurious
city hotels and watering places as at a
log tavern on the frontier, and without
regard to the extent of room required,
or the floor on which it is afforded, or
any of the circumstances which now
vary innkeepers' prices, then it may be
well to quote these instances of past
legislation as precedents. If the Supreme Court hold that it is competent
for state legislatures to prescribe both
the weight and the price of bread, then
let them extend the principle logically
to labor, land and all other commodities.
No commodity is so greatly "affected
with a public interest" as land. No
man's labor creates it. The aggregated
labor of society, or as it is called in
political economy, " the societary movement," gives it nearly its whole value.
Why then shall not state legislatures
fix the prices at which land shall be
sold ? If the spirit and disposition to
subject private property to 'public use
and control without compensation for
the loss of the jus disponendi, which is
indicated in this opinion, is to go on
unchecked, then are we virtually living
under a communistic system in which
no man owns anything which a vote of
the majority of the people cannot constitutionally deprive him of.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky in
Doe ex dem. Gaines v. Bzybrd, 1 Dana
490, has denied the power of a state legislature to provide that the owner of lands
should forfeit them unless he improved
them in a particular manner.
The
Supreme Court of Indiana in 117tbb
v.
Baird, 6 Ind. 17, has also denied the
power of a state legislature to compel
an attorney-at-law to give his professional services in defence of criminals
without compensation. Certainly somc
more fixed limitation must be arrived
at, upon the extent of legislative con-

trol over one's right of disposing of his
property and services, or, as Lord I 1ALE
styled it, " the right to make the most
of one's own.'
Upon neither side did counsel argue
this cause upon grounds so revolutionary
as those on which the court has based
its decision. Attorney-General Edsall's
brief is comparatively conservative and
devotes much stress to an argument
that the legislative power in question
results, in some vague and undefined
way, from the fact that the grain of
various owners is mixed and graded
while in the charge of the warehouseman, and that hence not the" property"
hut the "occupation" of the warehouseman is affected with a public interest.''
We do not perceive that either the Attorney-General or the Chief Justice undcrtakes to explain why the blending of
the grain of different owners should increase or strengthen the power of time
legislature to limit their rates of storage. Such a point would cut no figure
in the Chief Justice's opinion since lie
deduces his law entirely from the few
sentences in Lord HALE'S pamphlets
above referred to, which have no reference to the blending of the property of
different owners, and it is noticahle
that Lord IALE speaks only of " private property affected with a public interest," while Chief Justice VAxTE
speaks only of "occupation in which
tile public have an interest;" two
widely divergent phrases.
It is true that the blending of the
grain of various owners renders the
system of inspection necessary. But
inspection with all its incidents, is distinct from the prescribing of rates of
storage. The supposed necessity for
the latter results from tile immense
mass of grain, competing for storage,
and the !mail number of persons and
firms, nine in all, conducting the musiness. If there were no blending of the
grain of different owners the demand
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that the legislature should prescribe the
rates of storage would seem to be as
strong and as tenable as now.
It is true, the legislature has not
attempted to fix rates of storage except
upon grain stored id warehouses of the
classes A and B, the former being the
warehouses in Chicago, in which grain
of various owners is blended and the
latter being warehouses of like kind
elsewhere in .the state. In warehouses
of class C, in which grain is stored
without blending, no rates are prescribed.
This, however, is a mere incident.
Because the quantity of grain stored in
Chicago is so immense, two results follow, viz.: lst,'that the grain of different owners must be blended and all
must be sold by grade. This results in
the inspection system. 2d. There is a
popular demand that the charges for the
service of storing grain shall be regulated by the legislature. This demand
is proportionate to the difficulty of getting storage at reasonable rates. If
the grain of various owners were not
blended, this difficulty would be far
greater than it is, and consequently the
demand instead of being removed would
be intensified.
Evidently, therefore,
the demand for legislative regulation of
rates of storage, is neither legally nor
practically a consequence of the blending of the grain of various owners, nor
an incident of the inspection system.
It is of the same nature as the demand
for the like regulation of freights and
fares on the railways, except that it is
the extension of the demand to a class
of persons who enjoy no legal monopoly, no franchise, no exercise of the
power of eminent domain, no use of
any public property as an incident of

their occupation, no official or quasi
official position, and between whom
there are the like inducements to competition, in contemplation of law, as
there are in any of the kinds of business which are free from legislative restriction.
We have not thought it worth while
to quote largely from authorities, because in cases which rest on fundamental principles, the result is swayed by
an aggregation of concurring judgments
on so wide a range of points, that no
one prior decision becomes authoritative. Although ChiefJustice WAITE' S
opinion interweaves numerous citations

and sentences from various highly authoritative sources, each of them bears
only on some minor link in the chaia
of his argument, which may or may
not be sound without either sustaining
or overthrowing the decision itself. In
originality, at least, the opinion resembles that of Chief Justice MARSHALL in the Dartmouth College case.
MARSHALL assumed that a charter was a
contract.

WAITE assumes that a ware-

house is private property affected with a
public interest. Suffice it, that the decision itself in its general breadth
No
and purpose has no precedent.
other court has ever held that a
legislature could fix the rate at
which a private persoin performing a service, in which he has no other
monopoly than that which the possession of superior means for conducting

his business gives to him, and no aid
from the public, should be compensated
for the service. No such case is cited
in the opinion.
Therefore none need
be cited contra.
VAN 13UREN I)ENSLOW.
Union College of Law, Chicago, Ills.t

As we go to press we have received a copy of a dissenting opinion in the
principal case by Mr. Justice FIELD, in which Mr. Justice STRONG concurs. The
lateness of its reception prevents our printing it in its proper placc.-ED. AM.
LAW REG.
VOL. XXV.-69
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Supreme Judicial Court qf Iassachusetts.
COTTAGE STREET METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH v. EDWAI 1)

KENDALL,

EXECUTOR.

A gratuitous subscription, to promote the objects for which a corporation is established, cannot be enforced unless the promisee has, in reliance on the promise sued
on, done something, or incurred or assumed some liability or obligation; and it is
not sufficient that others were led to subscribe by the subscription sought to be

enforced.
CO.NTRACT to recover the amount of a subscription by A. P. Rollins, the defendant's testator, towards the erection of a chapel for
the plaintiff. The facts were substantially as follows:In April 1871, after the organization of the church, an informal
meeting of persons interested in building a chapel for said church
was held at the house of said Rollins, who was treasurer of the
trustees. A subscription was thereupon opened to see how much
could be raised for that purpose. Various persons announced their
willingness to give different sums, and the secretary, at the time, in
their presence and -with their knowledge, wrote down their names.
and the amounts so promised by each opposite thereto. Rollins
was one of those so promising, and said that his name might be put
down for $500. Ile afterwards, within a short time, acknowledged
and ratified such subsciiption orally. Being treasurer of the trustees,
he also received some payments from individuals on account of such
subscriptions.
Some months after this meeting, and long before August 1872,
some trouble arose between .Rollins and the other members, and
Rollins at their request withdrew from the office of treasurer, and
subsequently voluntarily ceased all participation in the affairs of
the society, except that lie remained one of its trustees until the
end of the year for which lie was chosen, and was present at a reorganization of the church in August 1872, made necessary by some
flaw in the original organization, in April 1871. No demand was
made on him for payment. ie died in March 1873.
The chapel was built before Rollins's death, by and for the use
of the plaintiff. There was conflicting evidence as to whether anything was done, or any lialility incurred or obligation assumed, by
the plaintiff in reliance upon the subscription of Rollins.
The defendant contended that nothing was done, nor any liability
or obligation incurred or assumed, by the plaintiff in reliance upon
the subscription of Rollins, that there was no consideration for the
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promise, and that the plaintiff was not the party to maintain this
action ; and asked the court so to rule.
rut thejudge before whoin the case was tried without a jury,
without passing upon the question of fiact, whiethcr the plaintiff,
relying upon tle subscription of Rollins, had done anything
or incurred or assumed any liability or obligation, ruled that
upon the facts above stated there was a sufficient consideration for
the promise of Rollins, and that the plaintiff was the proper party
to bring the action. The defendant excepted to these rulings.
J. TV. -Tammond, for the defendant.
-D. F. Crane, for the plaintiff.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GRAY, C. J.-The performance of gratuitous promises depends
wholly upon the good will which prompted them, and will not f~e
enforced by the law. Tie general rule is that, in order to support
an action, the promise must have been made upon a legal consideration moving iroin the promisee to the promisor: Exchange Bank
v. itiee, 107 Mass. 37. To constitute such consideration, there
must be either a benefit to the maker of the promise, or a loss,
trouble or inconvenience to, or a charge or obligation resting upon,
the party to whom the promise is made.
A promise to pay money to promote the objects for which a corporation is established falls within the general rule. In every case
in which this court has maintained an action upon a promise of this
description, the promisee's acceptance of the defendant's .promise
was shown either by express vote or contract, assuming a liability
or obligation, legal or equitable, or by some unequivocal act, such
as advancing or expending money, or erecting a building, in accordance with the terms of the contract, and upon the faith of the defendant's promise, so that there was a consideration directly moving
from the plaintiff to the defendant: isher v. Ellis, 3 Pick. 322;
Bryant v. Goodnow, 5 Id. 228 ; Anmherst Academy v. Cowls, -6
Id. 427; Williams College v. Danforth, 12 Id. 541 ; Thon son
v. Page, 1 Met. 565; Ives v. Sterling, 6 Id. 310; Walkins v.
Banes, 9 Cush. 537; .31rick v. French, 2 Gray 420; Lades'
Collegiate Institute v. French, 1 Id. 196; Athol 11Mrusic 1tall Co.
v. Cary, 116 Mass. 471. So in anson Trustees v. Stetson, 5 Pick.
506, in which the subscriptions were to increase a ministerial fund,
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the court "found it a Pact agreed" (whether in the case stated, or
by counsel at the argument, does not clearly appear by the report)
"that in consequence of the accumulation of the fund by these
means, the great purpose, namely, the settlement of a minister, has
been effected."
The suggestion in 5 Pick. 508, substantially repeated in 6 Met.
816, and in 9 Cush. 539, that "it is a sufficient consideration that
others were led to subscribe by the very subscription of the defendant," was in each case but obiter dictum, and appears to us to be
inconsistent with elementary principles. Similar promises of third
persons to the plaintiff may be a consideration for agreements betweeni
those persons and the defendant ; but as they confer no benefit upon
the defendant, and impose no charge or obligation upon the plaintiff
they constitute no legal consideration for the defendant's promise
to him.
The facts in the present case show no benefit to the promisor, and,
although it appears that the chapel was afterwards built by the
plaintiff, it is expressly stated in the bill of exceptions that the
learned judge who presided at the trial did not pass upon the question of fact whether the plaintiff -had, in reliance upon the promise
sued on, done anything or incurred or assumed any liability or
obligation. It does not therefore appear that there was any legal
consideration for the promise upon which this action is brought.
Exceptions sustained.
The law on the subject of voluntary
subscriptions for charitable, religious
or educational purposes seems to present seveial distinct phases, which are
vell marked by the adjudications.
1. The first was that all such subscriptions were null and void for want
of consideration, to wit, a pecuniary
benefit to the promisor. And in the
earlier decisions it seems to have beer
thought quite immaterial that the promisees had expended money ur incurred
liabilities, relying upon such subscriptions for reimbursement ; or that the
subscriber, after making his subscription, subsequently gave his note for the
amount subscribed, or otherwise ratified the original transaction.
One of the earliest reported cases is
Boutell v. Cowdin, 9 Mass. 254 (1812),

where the defendant subscribed, with
others, $100 for the creation of a permanent fund of $COO0 for the support
of the minister of the society of which
he was a member, and subsequently gave
hii note to the plaintiffs, as deacons
of the society, promising to pay them
"1$100 on demand, for the benefit of the
church aforesaid." The note was defended for want of consideration, although the plaintiffs' counsel argued it
was a benefit to the promisor, " inasmuch as the money was to avail to procure him the religious instruction so
The court
hiuhly valued by him."
cunsidered the objection well founded,
although there was another point in"olved, viz., whether the plaintiffs, if
duly constituted deacons of the society,
had by statute a corporate capacity to re-
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celve and manage a fund for the support
of the ndnister; and the decision might
-perhaps be sustained on this ground.
And perhaps, also, the peculiar want of
consideration here was that there was
no legal payee who could he compelled
to carry out the trust and apply the
money to the purpose in view. See
5 Pick. 508; 6 Pick. 434-5, where the
case is so explained.
Two years afterwards, however, the
same quection was considered in Trustees
of Linerick Academy v. Daris, I I Mass.
112 (1814). The defendant and sixty
others signed this paper: "Impressed
with the sense of the advantages from
free schools, we the subscribers agree
to pay the several sums affixed to our
names for creating an academy in Limerick, on such land as may be given by
any subscriber and adjudged most convenient and central by a majority of the
subscribers. July lst 1808." The land
was given and the academy erected on
the site fixed upon by a majority of the
subscribers. The legislature, in November 1808, incorporated the plaintiffs, and enacted that moneys subscribed for the use of said academy
should be held by the plaintiffs and their
successors in trust for said academy.
In a suit by the plaintiffs upon such
subqcription-paper, a nonsuit was ordered by the full court, on the ground of
"no mutuality, no parties, no valuable
consideration." The decision itselfmay
perhaps be supported upon the ground
that the subscription-paper contained no
promisee, either by name or description ;
but it is evident that the court thought
the want of consideration "insuperable." "The grand principle is," said
the court, "that voluntary agreements
and promises, however reasonable the
expectation from them of gifts or disbursements, even to public uses, where
made without consideration, are not to
be enforced as contracts. Here is nothing gained to the defendant, or lost to
any one else."

In 1824 a similar question arose In
the same court, in Trustees of Bridgei'ater Acadrky v. Giihert, 2 Pick. 579.
There the defendant with others, signed
this paper : "We the subscribers being
desirous that the academy edifice should
be rebuilt immediately, do hereby promise to pay to the committee which may
be chosen by the trustees of the Bridgewater Academy for the purpose of rebuilding the same, the several sums of
money, materials or labor for the above
purpose, which shall be set against our
names. Nathaniel Gilbert twenty-five
dollars in lumber. "1 It appeared that the
ohl academy was burned in 1822"; that
the trustees, a corporation, voted to
rebuild when sufficient funds should be
provided ; that the defendant and othels
subscribed ; that the trustees erected a
new building, for which the defendant
refused to furnish any lumber or pay
any money, "because the new building
was twenty-seven rods further from his
house than the old one." The action
was brought both upon the original subscription paper, and also for money
paid, laid out and expended at his request. The plaintiffs were nonsuited,
the court saying : " The subscription
paper will not sustain the action, and
the defendant, after he signed it, gave
the plaintiffs no encouragetnent to proceed in rebuilding, the beginning to provile materials on the faith of the subscription paper alone, was not sufficient
to show that expenses were incurred at
his implied request."
This may be
considered one of the strongest reported
cases against the validity of such subscriptions. The point that the promise
was to the committee to be chosen by the
trustees, while the action was brought
by the trustees themselves, does not appear to have been raised by the defendant.
These views and decisions were much
relied upon, and followed in Foxcroft
Aadenzyv. 1(thror, 4 Greenl. 332 (1826),
in which there was a distinct payee
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named in the subscription paper, and
the case goes to the full extreme of the
doctrine. The same may be said of
Steward v. Trustees of Ilamilton College,
2 Denio 403 (1845), affirmed on appeal
in I Comstock 581 (1848), which was
a subscription for a fund of $50,000,
the interest of which was to be applied to the payment of the salaries
of the officers of Hamilton College, N.
Y. So long as such views generally
prevailed, it was impossible to recover
upon any such subscriptions; bnt as
courts did not hesitate to pronounce
such defences "base and dishonorable,"
as well as "unjust," they soon found a
way to declare them invalid as well;
and that estimation of the defence may
account for the second phase or stage
of the law on this subject.
2. This view was that when several
persons subscribe a paper for some common public object, the promise of each
is a consideration for the promise of the
others, and the payee of the paper may
enforce the promise against each and
all. This doctrine seems to have been
first made the express ground of judicial
decision inNew Hampshire : Coigregational Society in Troy v. Perry, 6 N.
There the defendant
H. 164 (1833).
signed this note: "Jan. 27th 1825. For
and in consideration that a fund of
$1000 be raised for the support of the
ministry in the Congregational Society
in Troy, I promise to pay said society,
in part of the fund, $50 on demand."
It appeared that on the day of the date
of the note, a fund of $1000 was raised
by notes of a similar import with this
and made by different persons. The
coprt said : " It is objected that the
note is without consideration and void.
But we are of opinion that a good consideration was shown in this case.
When several agree to contribute to a
common object, which they wish to
accomplish, the promise of each is a
good consideration for the promises of
This seemed plausible,
the others."

and a legal way of ovcrcoming the objection which had hitherto prevailed in
such cases. It was accordingly incorporated without much reflection into some
text-books, and was adopted and approved in many quarters, notably in
lMatkins v. Eames, 9 Cush. 537, and
some others. But there is an inherent
difficulty in such a proposition, and
that is, that if the mutual promises do
form a sufficient consideration for each
other, so as to create a valid contract,
it would be a contract between the cosigners only, and not between them and
a third person, who was not a signer,
and which he could enforce in his own
name. It is not impossible that if the
other signers carried out the object of
the subscription, and advanced all the
money required to accomplish it, they
could recover of one delinquent subscriber, his proportionate part of the
outlay ; and perhaps this might be done.
not only in a count for money paid, but
also on the original subscription-paper.
This last was the case of George v. fllrris, 4 N. II. 533 (1829), in which there
was no count for money paid, but only
upon the original subscription, and in
which the promise'was to pay to " Arthur Livermore, in trust for the use of
us respectively, unless applied for building the court house as above provided."
And that case was cited and approved
in Lathrop v. Knoff, 27 Wis. 214
It may be questioned whether
(1870).
a count for money paid was not necessary in this case, but at all events the
decision is no authority for the doctrine
it is often cited to support, tha such
mutual promises form a good consideration for a contract with a third person,
not a subscriber, although named as
payee, which he can enforce. A consideration of mutual promises wholly between A. anml B. will not support a promisc hy citherto pay C. The fallacy of
such a proposition was clearly shown in
the same state in which it had its birth,
in Curry v. Rogers, 1 Foster 247 (1850).
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There the defendant with oiers signed
a .iil.eription paper for tile crectiou of
a literary institution to be built by a
committee dfiterwards chosen by a portitn of the subscribers, thedefenjant not
being present ;. but none of whom were
ubscribers. They erected the building,
and brought suit in their own names,
both upon the subscription paper and
also for money paid, materials furnished, &c., but were not allowed to recover on either count.
3. A third phase was, that although
the payees named in said subscription
paper could not recover upon theoriginal
subscription paqper for want of a consideration, yet if relying thereon, they
had properly expended money for th
common object, they might recover
upon a count for money paid, laid out,
expended, especially if the defendant
ratified the subscription after such outlay. The case of Trustees qf Forming.
ton Academyt v. Allen, 14 Mass. 171
(1817), seems to be one of the earliest
cases on this subject. This decision
was directly followed in the subsequent
case of Bryant v. Goodnow, 5 Pick. 228
(1827), notwithstanding the ittermediate contrary decision in 2 Pick.
579, above cited, and is now the settled
law of Massachusetts; the doctrine
being thus stated, viz. : When one subscribes with others a sum of money to
carry on some common project lawful
in itself, and supposed to be beneficial
to the projectors, and money is advanced
upon the faith of such subscription
with the express or implied conscet of
the subscribers, an action for money
paid, laid out and expended, may be
maintained to recover the amount 'of
the subscription, or such portion of it, as
will be equal to the subscriber's proportion of the expense incurred. See also
Jfqricl: v. French, 2 Gray 42.3 (1854).
In such cases the subscription paper is
held to be a request and authority by
the subscribers to lay out the money
for the proposed object, and so the

persons who advance it do so as agents
and on behalf of the others, and thus
the usual rule applies of a recovery for
money laid out for tite defendant's use,
or at his request. And some cases hold
that under such circumstances a recovery can be had even on the original
subscription. One of the earliest supports of this view was A/cAuley v.
Billenger, 20 Johns. 89 (1822), where
several persons at a voluntary meeting
of citizens were appointed a committee
to receive subscriptions to repair a
church.
They received subscriptions
promising to pay them certain sums for
that purpose, made a contract for the
repairs, which were carried out according to the terms of the subscription,
and the subscribers were held boundqto
the committee upon the subscription
paper alone, the court saying: "The
consideration for the promise was the
repairing of the church."
See also
lVatkins v. Eames, 9 Cush. 537 (1852).
4. There is still another class of
cases in which the validity of such subscriptions has been denied, but which
may well be supported on different
grounds ; and these are where by the
terms of the subscription paper, each
subscriber is to have an interest or
share in the object of the subscription,
a pew or pews in the church according
to the amount of his subscription, a
share in the aeademy, &e. Such were
the cases of T7Aonpson v. Page, 1 Met.
565 (1840) ; Ives v. Sterling, 6 Id.
310 (1843) ; 21yrick-v. French, 2 Gray
420 (1854), and many others; but
these all have distinct grounds of consideration, viz. : a benefit conferred or
pecuniary interest acquired by the subscriber, and he is therefore bound by
his contract in the same manner as any
subscriber for shares in a business corporation, who makes an express promise to pay for his share, is liable therefor. They do not, therefore, necessarily conflict with the decision in the
principal case, nor even with the doe-
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trincs advanced in the earlier cases
upon purely gratuitous subscriptions.
5. There is also a fifth ground on
which many such subscriptions rest ;
and that is where the payee, or the institution for whose benefit the subscription is made has expressly agreed to
do certain things, perform certain duties, or has complied with the conditions
on which the subscription was made;
these promises, obligations, &c., of the
promisee furnish a legal consideration
for the promise of the subscriber, whether it was or was not any benefit to him.
Thus, where D. subscribed $100 for
Williams College, on condition it should
not be removed from Willlamstown to
Northampton (as was then contemplated), and that the subscription should
be accepted within a year, and a vote
not to so remove the institution be
entered on the records of the institution, all of which was done, it was
held there was a sufficient legal consideration for the defendant's promise,
and that the plaintiffs could recover :
Williams College v. Danforth, 12 Pick.
541 (1832).
University of Vermont v. Buell, 2 Vt.
48 (1829), was one of the earliest to
lay down this doctrine; where the defendant subscribed fifty dollars to pay
for the erection of suitable college buildings, and it was held that the acceptance of the subscription and the actual
commencement of the work consummated the contract, so that the defendant
could not avoid payment ; which rule
was again directly affirmed in State
Treasurer v. Cross, 9 Vt. 289 (1837).
Caul v. Gibson, 3 Barr 416, rests upon
the same grounds. Indeed, this is so
plainly in analogy with the general
principles of law as to have been universally received and acted upon in too
many cases to cite in this note ; but
Barnes v. Perine, 2 Kern. 18 (1854),
is worthy of note, being in the same
state as Hamilton College v. Stewart,
ante.

Possibly the case of Trustees in Ilanson v. Stetson, 5 Pick. 506 (1827), may
fall into this class, although not distinctly put on that ground by the court,
and not easily reconcilable with what
had been before decided by the same
court. There several members of a
church agreed in writing to subscribe
whatever they felt able, to increase an
existing fund for the support of a minister, the same not to be binding unless
a sufficient amount was raised for that
purpose. The defendant subscribed fifty
dollars on that paper, and a sufficient
sum having been subscribed subsequently, gave his note to the plaintiffs
for the amount, acknowledging it to be
"for value received."
Upon the point
of consideration the court said : " As
to the consideration, it is admitted by
the note, and cannot be contradicted
without clear evidence to the contrary.
The promise was made to a body authorized by the legislature to receive it.
It was to increase a fund already in
existence, which was to be applied to a
most valuable purpose whenever it
should be adequate. The very purpose
of the subscription which the defendant
was instrumental in obtaining was to
put in activity the fund until then dormant. The promise was to be void unless
enough were obtained. The case shows
that enough was obtained. It is a sufficient consideration that others were
led to subscribe by the very subscription
of the defendant. And we find it a
fact agreed, that in consequence of the
accumulation of the fund by these
means, the great purpose, viz., the settlement of a minister, has been effected."
Possibly this last fact was the principal
ground of the decision.
6. But there is still another class of
cases on this subject, quite different
from any of the foregoing, where there
has been no expenditure incurred, or
express promises made by the payee,but
where, nevertheless, the subscriptions
have been upheld upon the ground of
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an implied duty and obligation on the
part of the payee (if the-subscription
is accepted), to carry out the object of
the paper, and apply the money for the
purposes and objects intended by the
donor. This is sometimes called an
inplitd pronise on his part ; thus it has
been said there exists a promise for a
promise, a sufficient consideration
upon familiar principles.
This was
most distinctly brought out as the ground
of the decision in Collier v. Baptist
Education Society, 8 B. Monroe 68
(1847).
There the contract was in
these words : "I hereby promise to
pay to the trustees of the Baptist Education Society, or their order, $250, as
a donation in five equal annual instalments." The society was a corporation, and authorized to receive donations for the benefit of the institution ;
and the court say: "The donation was
authorized by law ; there was on one
side an obligation to appropriate this
fund according to the provision of the
charter, and the promise to pay on the
other ; and the note, viewed in connec.
tion with the law which authorized it,
shows a sufficient consideration for its
execution, and to estop the defendant
to deny that there was no legal or
valuable consideration."
This it will
be seen was a great step in advance of
anything we have before considered, for
there was no proof of any liability incurred, or promises made by the payee,
nor of other similar promises made by
other parties, induced by the defendant's
donation. It lacked, therefore, every
element which has been relied upon in
the cases before referred to. A similar
ground was distinctly maintained in
Trm Academy v. NdLon, 24 Vt. 194
(1852).
The same doctrine was also
advanced by CuAPMAN, J., in Ladies'
Collegiate Institute v. French, 16 Gray
201 (1860), but as in this last case the
payees lind expended large sums in
carrying out the object of the subseripVoL. XXV.-70

tions, and relying upon them for defraying the expenses, the actual decision has other grounds upon which to
rest, than that of an implied duty or
obligation to appropriate the funds for
the purpose contemplated by the donor.
The case of Amherst Academy v.
Cowls, 6 Pick. 427 (1828), seems to
rest largely on this ground. There the
defendant, in July 1819, gave his note
to the plaintiffs for $100, "it being the
amount of my subscription to the charitable fund for the education of indigent
pious young men, and in pursuance
of my covenants and engagements expressed in the constitution of said fund,
by me subscribed May 23d 1818. ' The
principal defence was a want of consideration. There was no proof of *ny
expenditure incurred or liability expressly assumed by the payecs, and
there was no count for money paid. As
to this point of the defence the court
said: "Was there a consideration for
this note when it was given? In one
sense there was not ; that is, the promisor had received nothing at the time
from the payees which was of any pecuniary value. Biut it is quite sufficient to
create a consideration that the other
party, the payee, should have assumed
an obligation in consequence of receiving the note, which he was compellable
either at law or equity to perform ; unless
the promisor should be able to show
when sued that the payee had refused, or
was unable, or had unreasonably neglected to perform the engagement on his
part; in which cases a defence might
be raised on the ground of a failure
of the consideration. The defence is
not put upon that ground, and so it
must be presumed that the corporate
body to whom the promise is made has
applied its funds to the purposes for
which they were raised, or is ready and
willing to do it whenever the different
contributors to it shall have performed
their engagements. In a court of eqaity
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of general jurisdcton they could be compdlled to di.wharge their dluty. Without

such a court they would be subjectcd to
a loss of their chartcr by refusal or
neglect; for without doubt the legislature are the visitors of all corporations
founded by them for public purposes,
where there is no individual founder or
donor, and may direct judicial process
against them for abuses or neglects,
which by common law would cause a
"We do
forfeiture of their charter."
not find that it has ever been decided
that where there are proper parties to
the contract, and the promisee is capable in law of carrying into effect tile
purpose for which the promise is made,
and is in fact amenable to law for negligence or abuse of his trust, such a contract is void for want of consideration."

parish, was binding, although no expenses had been incurred or liabilitics
entered into by the plaintiff ; the bare
acceptance of tie subscription being
held to be "an implied agreement to
apply the proceeds of the fund as above
This acceptance and undermentioned.
taking of the truste.; at the request of the
donorsform a good consideration Jbr the
note in question."

If the principles advanced in the last
class of cases be entirely sound, it may
be the principal case might have been
supported on the facts found, notwith.
standing tle judge below did not pass
upon the question of fact, whether the
plaintiff had assumed any liability or
There was a cotlpetent
obligation.
payee, an absolute subscription, an acceptance thereof by tle payee, a subsequent ratification by the defendant, and
Similar views were expressed in
an actual collection of money from the
Trustees of Fry,.burg v. RipleT, 6 Grcenl.
other subscribers, all of which might be
443 (1830), in which it was held (notwithstanding the prior decision of Fox- thought to create an implied duty, or
raise an implied promise to devote tie
crojf Academy v. Furor, in the same
court, and to which no allusion seems* proceeds to the object intended by the
donors ; and in that light, might, in
to have been made by court or counsel)
the view of some authorities, constitute a
that a subscription to a fund, the ingood consideration for the defendant's
terest of which was to be appropriated
for the support of a minister of the

promise.

EDM NJDH. BENNETT.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
TIHE WOOD M1OWING AND REAPING MACHINE CO. v. CALDWELL.
A statute required agents of foreign corporations, before entering upon their
duties, to file the evidence of their authority with the county clerk, together with
the consent of the corporation, that suits brought by residents of the state on demands
arising out of transactions with such agents, might be commenced against the corporation by service of process upon such agent. It then provided that whoever
ahould act as such agent without complying with the statute, should be subject to
a fine of $50 ; and that "such foreign corporation shall not enforce in any courts
of this state any contracts made by their agents or persons assuming to act as their
agents, before a compliance by such agents or persons acting as such, with the
provisions " above recited.
Held, that a contract entered into by an agent before the filing of such authority
and consent, was not invalid by reason of such omission.
Held further, that the corporation may recover on such a contract, provided such
authority and consent are filed previous to the commencement of suit; but tile
failure to file the same will be valid ground for a plea in abatement.
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While it is Itgeneral rule that contracts entered into in disregard of statutory
provisions arc void, the rule is not inflexible, and any case must be considered an
exception to it where front the statute the intention of the legislature appears to be

that the contract shall not be invalid, but that some other consequence which the
statute prescribes shall be the sole penalty.

Tiis was an action by the Walter A. Wood Mowing and Reaping
Machine Company, against Samuel A. Caldwell, on a complaint in
two paragraphs; the first, on a note for the price of a mowing and
reaping machine; the second, on an account for the price of the
same machine.
The answer was in two paragraphs, setting forth-1. General
denial. 2. That the plaintiff was a foreign corporation; that the
machine was sold by its agent before lie had complied with the requirements of the statute in regard to foreign corporations.
After demurrer overruled to the second paragraph, and exception
taken, the plaintiff replied-i. In denial. 2. That the machine
sold was one of Wood's patent, and was sold by the agent of the
company who manufactured it for and by authority of the patentee.
A demurrer was sustained to this reply, and exception to the
ruling noted.
The cause was tried on the issues formed, resulting in a verdict
for the defendants, and after motion for a new trial overruled, a
judgment on the verdict.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PERKINS, J.-The record in the cause presents two questions to
this court, the decision of both of which is necessary to its final
determination. The questions are:
1. Is it necessary that the agent of the manufacturer, by authority of the patentee, of a patented article, should comply with the
requirements of our act respecting foreign corporations before he
can sell such article in this state ?
2. Does the failure of an agent of such corporation for the sale
of articles not patented, to comply with the requirements of said
act, render his contracts in the name and on the behalf of the corporation void ?
The first question has already been answered in the negative, by
this court, in the case of the Grover & Baker Sewing .1acline
Company v. Butler, at this term. We proceed to the second question.
In 1865, a statute was enacted regulating foreign insurance companies, 1 Rev. Stats. 1876, 594, which has been held to be a sub-
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stitute, so far as such companies are concerned, for the Act of 1852,
regulating foreign corporations : h7offman v. Banks, 41 Ind. 1.
This statute of 1865, in section 1, declares: "That it shall not
be lawful for any agent or agents of any insurance company incorporated by any other state than the state of Indiana, directly or
indirectly, to take risks or transact any business of insurance in
this state, without first procuring a certificate of authority from the
auditor of state; and, further,. that "no insurance company, or
agent or agents of any insurance company, incorporated by another
state shall transact any business of insurance in this state, unless
such company is possessed of at least $100,000 of actual capital
invested in stocks or bonds," &c. ; and, further, that before the
agent shall receive the necessary certificate of authority to transact
business from the auditor of state, he must produce proof to that
officer, of such investment, and of the existence of other facts required
by thee statute as conditions precedent, to exist before, &c.
The seventh section is as follows :"Any person or persons, violating the provisions of this act, shall
upon conviction thereof, in any court of competent jurisdiction, be
fined in any sum, not exceeding $1000, or imprisonment in the
county jail not more than thirty days, or both, at the discretion of
the court. Violations of the provisions of this act may be prosecuted by information filed by the prosecuting attorney of the proper
county, or by indictment of the grand jury."
The statute contains no section or clause thereof, declaring what
the effect of a non-compliance with its provisions shall be upon contracts made before compliance. Contracts in violation of this statute
are held void: 41 Ind. 1; 46 Ind. 223; 47 Ind. 236.
We turn now to the Act of 1852, 1 Rev. Stats. 1876, 373, regulating foreign corporations. The first, second and third sections of
the act are as follows :"Sect. 1. Be it enacted by the GeneralAssembly qf the state of
Indiana, that agents of corporations, not incorporated or organized
in this state, before entering upon the duties of their agency in this
state, shall 'deposit-in the clerk's office of the county where they
propose doing business therefor, the power of attorney, commission,
appointment, or other authority under or by virtue of which they
act as agents.
"Sect. 2. Said agents shall procure from such corporation, and
file with the clerk of the Circuit Court of the county where they
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)ro)ose doing 6usiness, before commencing the duties thereof, a
(lily authenticated order, resolution, or other sufficient authority of
the board of directors or managers of such corporations, authorizing
citizens or residents of this state, having a clain or demand against
such corporation' arising out of any transactionin this state with
sueh agents, to sue for and maintain an action in respect to the
same in any court of this state, of competent jurisdiction, and further authorizing service of process in such action on such agent to
be valid service on such corporation, and that such service shall
authorize Judgment and all other proceedings against such' cororation.
'" Sect. 3. The service of the process on such agents in actions
commenced against such corporations, shall be deemed a service on
the corporation, and shall authorize the same proceedings as in other
cases. "
The fifth section provides what acts shall be deemed acts of agency
for a foreign corporation subjecting the person doing them to the
provisions of the act. The sixth, seventh and fourth sections are
as follows:" Sect. 6. The foregoing section shall not apply to persons acting
as agents for foreign corporations for a special or temporary purpose,
or for purposes not within the ordinary business of such corporations,
nor shall it apply to attorneys at law as such.
" Sect. 7. Any person acting as agent of foreign corporations as
aforesaid, neglecting or refusing to comply with the foregoing provisions as to agents, shall, upon presentment or indictment, be fined
in any sum not less than $50."
"Sect. 4. Such foreign corporation shall not enforce in any
courts of this state, any contracts made by their agents or persons
assuming to act as their agents, before a compliance by such agents
or persons acting as such, with the provisions of sects. 1 and 2 of
this act."
IBy a comparison of these statutes it will be seen that the insurance act declares expressly that it shall not be lawful for any agent
of a foreign insurance company to transact any business, &c., till
he has procured a certificate of authority to do so from the auditor
of state; declares that "no insurance company or agent or agents,"
shall transact any business, &c., unless, &c. ; declares that any
person or persons (not any agent or agents), violating the provisions
of this act shall be fined, &c. ; and contains, as has been said, no
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section or clause declaring the effect, upon contracts, of a violation
of its provisions.
On the other hand, the act regulating foreign corporations, requires no certificate of authority to do business, from the auditor to
make it lawful for the agent to do business. It only requires that
he shall dep9sit in the county clerk's office, his appointment as
agent of the company, and an instrument from the company authorizing it to be sued and brought into court by service of process on
the agent, in certain cases ; and declares that any agent neglecting
to comply with the provisions of the act, as to agents, shall be fined,
&c. ; and that the company shall not sue on contracts made by
their agents till the provisions of the statute are complied with by
such agents.
The provisions of the act bearing upon the question to be decided,
in this case, are all in form directory or mandatory to the agents
alone, and penal to them alone. In the foreign insurance act there
are positive declarations of illegality of acts; positive prohibitions
to the corporation, and penalties upon "any person or persons violating the provisions of this act ;" not simply upon agents neglecting to comply with the provisions as to agents ; and it leaves the
effect of such violations upon contracts, to be determined by interpretation and construction of the statute, by the courts, according
to the rules of the common law.
At common law, the general rule is that if a statute forbids an
act to be done or provides a penalty for doing it, any contract to
do such act is invalid whether the statute declares it so or not :
The tate v. The State Bank, 5 Ind. 358; The Rising Sun Ins.
Co. v. Slaughter, 20 Ind. 520. But says FRAZER, J., in Deming
v. The State, 23 Ind. 416, "the rule is properly applicable only
where the reason upon which it is founded exists. The law ceases
with the keason thereof, and it is a grave error to regard it as a
merely arbitrary rule applicable to all contracts which are prohibited by statute. It is generally applicable because the thing prohibited is usually immoral, or against public policy;" and the
court heldthe contract in the case before it not void, because made
in violation of a statute; and expressly overruled the case of the
tate v. The State Bank, supra, because the general rule, that a
contract prohibited by statute was void, was not properly apl~lied
in that case. The doctrine laid down by the court, in D)eming v.
The State, supra, substantially overruled also The Rising San
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Ins. Co. v. SiSaughter, 20 Ind. 520 ; and afterward, in AXew Bnglaml .Fire, ,&.e., Co. v. Robinson, 25 Ind. 536, GiRL~onY, J., in
delivering the opinion, says: "It is urged in arginent that the
complaint is bad fir not showing a compliance, by the local agent
of the company, with the requirements of the act respecting foreign
corporations and their agents, in this state: 1 G. & II. 272 ; 1 R.
S. (1876) 373. It is contended that under this law all contracts
of fireign corporations are void, and that the exception to the rule
is where they comply with its provisions. We do not so regard
*that statute." Te opinion then speaks approvingly of the principles asserted touching contracts prohibited by statute, in -Dening
v. The State, 23 Ind. 416, and proceeds: "It would seem to follow that the contract of a foreign corporation, made in violation of
a statute designed for the protection of our citizens, would not as
to the latter, be void. Moreover this view is strengthened by the
fact that the act itself provides what shall be the effect of such violation on the contract."
We may properly observe here that the case of The Rising Sun,
,c., Co. v. Slau hter, supra,is disapproved in Tlje .ureka Ins. Co.
v. Parks, 1 Cincinnati Superior Court Rep. 575.
Early in this opinion, we pointed out some of the differences
between the acts concerning foreign corporations and foreign insurance companies in force in this state, to show that decisions on contracts arising under the latter would not be authorities in cases
arising upon contracts under the former. The state of Winconsin
has a statute apparently like our foreign insurance act, and Missouri
a statute apparently like our foreign corporation act. In 18 Mo.
229, and in 19 Id. 53, the Supreme Court of that state decided
that a failure to comply with the requirements of the statute did
not make the contracts of the company void.
The case of .,tnaIns. Co. v. Harvey, 11 Wis. 394, came before
the Supreme Court of that state, arising upon a statute, as we have
said, like our foreign insurance act, and counsel referred the court to
the cases in Missouri, decided upon a statute much like our foreign
corporation act. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin said: " We
are referred to the cases of Colutinbus fls. Co. v. Walsh, 18 Mo.
229, and Clark v. liddh'ton, 19 Id. 53, in which the Supreme
('ourt of that state held that the neglect of the agent of foreign
insurance companies to take out a license as required by their law,
did not invalidate contracts of insurance made by him. It " will
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be observed on examining their statute, that it contains no express
prohibition against the transaction of business without such license.
It requires the agent to obtain a license and pay a tax, and imposes
a penalty for failure to do so, or for transacting business without
such license. The court says the act imposes a penalty on the
agent, but does not make the contract void."
While the general rule is that a contract prohibited by statute is
void, we have seen that there are many exceptions; and the question
is, how shall a court determine whether a .case is within or without
the general rule ? In Harrisv. 1?unnells, 12 How. U. S. Rep. 79,
Mr. Justice WAYNE, in delivering the opinion of the court, said:
"It is true that a statute containing a prohibition and a penalty
makes the act which it punishes unlawful, and the same may be
implied from a penalty without a prohibition; but it does not follow
that the unlawfulness of the act was meant by the legislature to
avoid a contract made in contravention of it. When the statute is
silent and contains nothing from which the contrary can be inferred,
a contract in contravention of it is void." "That legislators do not
think the rule one of universal obligation, or that upon grounds of
public policy it should always be applied, is very certain. For in
some statutes it is said, in terms, that such contracts are void, in
others that they are not so. In one statute there is no prohibition
expressed, and only a penalty; in another there is prohibition and
penalty, in some of which contracts in violation of them are or not
void according to the subject-matter and object of the statute; and
there are other statutes in which there are penalties and prohibitions,
in which contracts made in contravention of them will not be void,
unless one of the parties to them practises a fraud upon the ignorance of the other. It must be obvious from such diversities of
legislation, that statutes forbidding or enjoining things to be done,
with penalties accordingly, should always be fully examined before
courts should refuse to give aid to enforce contracts which are said
to be in contravention of them." See also Smith v. .Afanlwod, 14
M. & I. 450.
From these cases it appears that what the legislature meant in
the enactment of the statute-the intention of the legislature, as
inferred from an examination of the entire act, is to be the guide to
the court in determining whether the particular case should form
an exception to the general rule. That intention may be declared
in the act, or it may be inferred from all its provisions, in connec-
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tion 'with thc subject-matter and circumstances. Pangborn v.
JJ'estlake, 36 *Iowa 546, and lfowett v. Stewart, 54 'Mo. 400, are
strong cases to this point. See also The Yarniers' Bank v. Hale,
59 N. Y. 53.
Before speaking further on the point of intention, it will be proper
to ascertain the meaning of section 4 of the foreign corporation
act. It is copied above. It is urged that a correct interpretation
is that a foreign corporation may not enforce, at any time, either
before or after compliance with sections 1 and 2, a contract
inade before a compliance with the act, in the courts of this state;
but we think this interpretation inconsistent with the purpose of the
act; is somewhat unreasonable; not in harmony with the general
spirit of the act; against its better grammatical construction ; and
not supported by its legislative history. While this interpretation
concedes the validity of the contract, it renders it practically void,
by prohibiting its enforcement. We can see no good reason, the
contract being admitted to be valid, why its enforcement should be
delayed longer than non-compliance with the requirements of the
statute continues.
The legislative history of the act shows that the General Assembly desired to make prominent two ideas:1. That the act was not designed to inaugurate the policy of
hostility to foreign corporations, and to forbid their contracting
within the state; that it was not its purpose to deprive the state of
the benefit of the capital and business enterprise that might be introduced through their instrumentality.
2. That the act was only intended to apply to such corporations
as established permanent agencies in the state for the purpose of
doing that character of business that would make them the debtors
of our citizens, and render it necessary for the accomplishment of
justice that the indebtedness should be enforced by personal judgments within the state.
These propositions are important in this case, as they aid in
ascertaining the purpose of the legislature in enacting the statute;
that it was not intended as a prohibition upon foreign corporations
to contract in the state, but was merely intended to furnish the
means by which our citizens could procure personal judgments
against the foreign corporations who were their debtors. But two
amendments were made to the act, which was House Bill No. 247,
VOL. XXV.-71
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during its passage through the legislature, and they were made on
the 11th day of June 1852, upon the motion of Mr. King, who
introduced it. The original fourth section was stricken out, and
the fourth section as it appears in the act substituted and the words
"a special or temporary purpose, or for" were inserted in the sixth
section. This legislative action appears in the House Journal of
1852, on page 2125. If it had been the purpose of the legislature
to render a contract invalid, where it was made by the agent of a
foreign corporation before lie complied with sections 1 and 2, it
would have so declared in sect. 4 when it undertook to provide what
effect such non-compliance should have upon the corporation. It did
not see fit to leave the judiciary to determine how the corporation
-would be affected by sections 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 of the act, where
the agent had not complied with sections I and 2 at the time he
-made a contract, but it declared that effect in section 4. The
legislature must be supposed to have intended just what it said and
no more, and that is, that a foreign corporation should not enfbrce
such a contract in the courts of the state until it was placed in a
position by a compliance with the act where personal service could
be had upon it within the state and personal judgments taken
against it.
In connection -with the foregoing, as matter indicating legislative
design in passing the Act of June 17th 1852, we refer to the fact
that Judge HESTER, who was a prominent member of the legislature of 1852; and who, by its direction, prepared for it and superintended the publication of the Revised Statutes of 1852, has the
following marginal note oppposite section 4:"Not to enforce contracts till they comply with sects. 1 and 2 :"
1 R. S. of 1852, p. 243. We think the meaning of the section is,
that suits on contracts, entered into before compliance by the agents
with the requirements of the statute, shall be delayed till compliance has taken place. Such being the meaning of the fourth section the intention of the legislature in the enactment is manifest.
and the construction of the whole act is easy. It does not render
contracts, such as that on which this action is brought, void; but
if suit be instituted on any such contract, and an answer be filed of
non-compliance with the statute, such answer will lhow that the
suit is. prematurely brought; and if well pleaded and true, will
operate to abate the suit. "That the right of action had not
accrued at the commencement of the suit may be pleaded in abate-
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Ment, as, where an action oi contract is commenced before the
tinte appointed for performance :" Gould on Pleading 269. Should
the fat that the suit is preniaturely brought appear in the cornplaint, it could, of course, be taken advantage of by demnurrer.
Judgment reversed with costs, and remanded for further proceeding in accordance with this opinion.
That a contract entered into in contravention of some statutory provision
is not necessarily void is very well shown
in Pangbornv. lestlake, 36 Iowa 546,
cited in the preceding opinion, in which
COLE, J., gives as the "true test" that
"while as a general rule a penalty imlilies a prohibition, yet the courts will
always look to the language of the
statute, the subject-matter of it, the
wrong or evil which it seeks to remedy
or prevent, and the purpose sought to
be accomplished in its enactment; and
if from all these it is manifest that it
was not intended to imply a prohibition
or to render the prohibited act void, the
courts will so hold, and construe the
act accordingly."
The question arose
in that case upon a statute which 1Provided that "if any person should sell,
&c.,a lot in any platted town or addition thereto before the plat had been
duly acknowledged and recorded, ho
should forfeit and pay $50 for each and
every lot or part of lot sold," &c.
The court held that the statute did not
make the sale void, and the liability to
the forfeiture was the sole consequence
of a disregard of the statute. To this
effect were cited Strong v. Darling, 9
Ohio 201 ; Mason v. Pitt, 21 Mo. 391 ;
Beis v. Becker, I Kans. 226 ; Iatrous
v. Blair, 32 Iowa 58 ; and Fochler v.
Ford, 24 Row. 322. The recent case of
Lesterv. lowrardBank, 33 Md.558, presented a similar question. The statute
unler which the bank was organized,
provided that no director or other officer
of the bank should borrow from it, under
a penalty of fine and imprisonment.

The bank, nevertheless, made a loan to
its president, and the validity of this
loan was at issue in the suit. RoBNsoN, J., discusses the bearing upon the
question of the maxim in pari delicto
potior est conditio defendentis et possidentis, and while recognising it as a
sound general rule in its application to
prohibited contracts, holds nevertheless
that "the rights and remedies of parties
growing out of prohibited contracts are
to be determined by the construction of
the statute itself according to the wellestablished rules of interpretation, and
if it. shall appear that it was not the intention of the legislature to declare the
contract void, although made against
the prohibition, this intention will be
gratified, even if it should contravene
some general principle of law." Applying this rule the contract of loan was
held to be enforcible. Substantially the
same rule is laid down in Vining v.
Bricker, 14 Ohio N. S. 331, which was
a case of a sale of diseased sheep in
violation of the provisions of a penal
law, and in which the sale was sustained.
No rule more definite can possibly be
indicated ; every case must be determined by a consideration of the terms
of the statute itself. See also Shoemaker
v. Nrational Mehchanics' Bank, 2 Abb.
U. S. 416 ; Stewart v. National Union
Bank, Id. 424 ; MitionalExchanqe Bank
v. Moore, 2 Bond 170 ; O'l-are v. Second
NXitional Bank of Titusville, 77 Penna.
St. 96; Babcock v. Goodrich, 47 Cal.
488 ; Allen v. Freedmnan's Savings, &c.,
Bank, 14 Fla. 418.
T. M. C.
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Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
GEORGE T. PAINE v. SCHENECTADY INSURANCE CO.
A judgment in another state embracing the same matter is conclusive, although
the suit in which the judgment has been obtained was begun after the one to which
the judgment is pleaded in bar, and although in the former the matter was put in
issue only as a set-off.
A judgment under such circumstances is well pleaded puis darreincontinuance.
Where such plea sets forth that the judgment was obtained by the receiver of
the present defendant, a corporation, and that the suit was between the same parties,
it will be inferred that for the purposes of such suit the receiver and the corporation
were legally identical.
A claim that the judgment set up in the plea has been appealed from, will not
be regarded unless it is properly averred in the pleadings.

THIS was an action of assumpsit to recover damages for breach
*of contract. It was commenced in the Court of Common Pleas
August 27th 1870. The plaintiff recovered judgment in that court
at the December Term 1875. The defendant appealed to this court
at the March Term 1876. May 18th.1876, the defendant filed a
plea puis darrein continuance, setting forth that on the 8th May
1876, George T. Hanford, who had been duly appointed receiver
of the goods and effects of the defendant, had impleaded the plaintiff in the Supreme Court in the state of New York, and recovered
judgment against him for $1878.11 and costs, "which still remains in full force and effect, not in any wise reversed, annulled,
discharged or satisfied." The plea set forth the proceeding in the
New York suit, showing that the plaintiff therein pleaded in setoff the matters involved in this case, and averred that the cause of
action and the issue raised by the pleadings were the same in both
suits, and that the parties were identical. To this plea the plaintiff
demurred.

Beach

Osfield and .Edwin Metcalf, for plaintiff.

Dexter B. Potterand John Turner, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DunREE, C. J. -- The first cause of demurrer is, that the suit set
forth in the plea is not alleged to have been instituted before the
commencement of the present suit. And in his brief, the counsel
for the plaintiff contends that there is no precedent for such a plea
where the judgment was recovered by the defendant, or was recov-
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ered in a suit commenced subsequently to the suit in which it was
pleaded.
We do not see that it makes any difference which -party has recovered judgment. Tho true question is, whether the controversy
has been determined by a competent tribunal having jurisdiction;
for, if it has been, the defendant has the right to insist that it shall
not be further prosecuted, unless for some technical reason he cannot have the benefit of the estoppel. The plaintiff says he cannot
have tihe benefit of the estoppel because the suit in this state was
first commenced. Is this so? We think not. The defendant had
the right to sue the plaintiff in New York, notwithstanding the
plaintiff had sued him in lRhode Island. The plaintiff, in defending against tlme New York suit, put in issue the same controversy
which was in issue in the Rhode Island suit, and it was decided
against him. Why should lie not be concluded, and if concluded,
why should not the defendant have the benefit of the conclusion by
plea puis darrein? If the judgment in New York had been recovered before the suit in Rhode Island, the defendant would certainly have been entitled to plead it. Indeed, such a judgment
would be pleadable in bar, if recovered in a foreign country, and a
fortiori, under the federal Constitution and law, when recovered in
a sister state: Ricardo v. Gareias, 12 C. & F. 868; Bissell v.
Briggs, 9 Mass. 462 ; Mill8 v. Duryee, 7 Cranch. 481 ; 2 Am.
Lead. Cas. (5th ed.) 611 et seq., where this subject is discussed,
and the cases fully cited.
The two cases of Baxley v. Linah, 16 Penna. St. 241, and North
Bank v. Brown, 50 Me. 214, are closely in point. In Baxley v.
linah, 16 Penna. St. 241, an action was commenced in Maryland,
December 30th 1846, and in Pennsylvania for the same cause, June
2d 1847. The defendant pleaded the prior pendency of the Maryland action in abatement to the Pennsylvania action, and the plea
was overruled, the plea of prior pendency being available only when
both actions are pending in the same state. Bowne et al. v. Joy,
9 Johns. 221; Wlalsh et al. v. _Durkin, 12 Id. 99. Subsequently,
January 81st 1848, the plaintiff recovered judgment against the
defendant in the Maryland action; and December 5th 1849, the
defendant pleaded it in bar puis darrein continuance. The.plaintiff demurred. The court, however, sustained the plea.
The only material difference between that case and the case at bar
is, that there the judgment was recovered first in the earlier case,
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here in the later. But the judgment, whenever recovered, is still
a judgment; and why, then, is it not pleadable as such? In Nortl
Bank v. Brown, 50 Me. 214, the plaintiff commenced suit against
the defendant in Maine,'January 11th 1858; and in New York,
for the same cause, January 21st 1858. Judgment was first obtained
in the New York suit, and it was held to be a good defence to the
suit in Maine. Here the judgment does not appear to have been
specially pleaded; but if it had been specially pleaded, we see no
reason why the decision would not have been the same. We think
the first cause of demurrer is not sufficient.
The second cause is, that it does not appear that the New York
suit was -prosecuted by or for the defendant corporation, or by its
authority, or for its benefit.
The plea sets forth that the New York suit was prosecuted by
George T. Hanford, as receiver of the goods and effects of the
defendant, and- avers that the parties are identical ; meaning, doubtless, that they are in legal effect the same. We infer from this
that, under the laws of New York, the receiver, for the purposes of
his appointment, is virtually the corporation, and that therefore a
suit by him as receiver is, in legal effect, a suit by the corporation.
We the more readily infer that the law is so in New York, because
it is so in this state. We think, where the judgment of a sister state
is pleaded, we ought not to.be too strict or technical, but that we
ought to administer the law in a spirit of liberal comity, and to allow
the plea every fair intendment, so as not to defeat the constitutional
privilege of the judgment. If this suit were pending in New
York, such a judgment would doubtless be a bar to it. We think,
therefore, that the second cause of demurrer cannot be sustained.
The third cause of demurrer is substantially the same as the
second, and is for the same reason overruled.
The fourth cause is, that the cause of action in the two suits does
not appear to be identical. The plea avers that it is identical, and
we do not find, from an examination of the judgment as pleaded,
any sufficient reason to think it is not so. See Ricardo v. Garcias,
12 C. & F. 368,401.
The plaintiff states in his brief that an appeal has been taken
from the judgment rendered in New York. The plea, however,
does not show this. Prim, facie the judgment as pleaded appears
to be final and conclusive. Upon demurrer, we can only know what
the plea discloses. If the plaintiff desires us to decide upon the
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effect of the appeal, lie shouhl bring the fact of the appeal before
us by proper pleading and proof.
Upon the (uestiou whether the court can take cognisance of the
New York law as to the effect of an appeal, unless pleaded and
proved, see 2 Am. Lead. Cas. (5th ed.) 648 et 8eq.
Demurrer overruled.
Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
TIOMAS 11. WILLIAMS v. THE CITY OF NEWPORT.
A municipal corporation which has created a department in the municipal government may abolish it at any time unless restricted by some provision of its charter.
Where such a department is abolished the officers connected with it are rendered
functus officio, and unless there has been a contract between them and the city for
service for a time fixed, they have no right to any further compensation.
Such a contract is not implied by the mere election of an officer for a term named.
In such case the officer is not bound to serve the full term nor does the corporation
bind itself to keep the office in existence for him.

I., error from Campbell Circuit Court. Defendant, a municipal
corporation, by resolution of its council created a fire department and
plaintiff was appointed by the council as chief of the fire department
for a term of two years. Before the expiration of that term the
council abolished the department.
B7. IF. Nelson and John S. .Ducker, for the plaintiff.
Min. JBoden, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRYOR, J.-The city council having been empowered to organize
and maintain a fire department, it necessarily followed that the
power of selecting the officers to control that department belonged
to that body, there being nothing in the city charter to prevent its
exercise. They fixed the term of office of the chief of the fire
department at two years, his salary to be at the rate of fifty dollars
a month.
He was also ex officio one of the board, whose duty it was to
make and enforce such rules as might be deemed necessary to operate
this department of the city government.
There was no contract between the appellant and the city by
which the services of the former had been secured to the city for any
length of time. It was optional with appellant, after the acceptance of the office by him, to retain it or not, and, upon his resignation, no action by reason of the fact could have been maintained
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against him by the city. It was an office created by the city legislature, pertaining to the fire department, for the safety of the property within its boundary, and when not proving beneficial the
council had not only the power to abolish the offices connected with
it, but the department itself. This seems to have been done, and
the department has no longer an existence. The case of Chase v.
C'ty of Lowell, reported in 7 Gray, conduces to sustain the view
taken of this question by counsel for appellant. - In that case, however, it appears that the committee appointed for the purpose of
selecting the city engineer were authorized to contract with, him
for the ensuing year, or for such tine as they may deem expedient;
and having entered into a contract for the services fo a fixed time,
it might well be argued that both parties were bound to perform
its stipulations.
The appellant was an officer of the city by reason of his appointment, subject to the right of the council to abolish his office. It
was necessary not only to appoint the chief of the department, but
to employ many others to aid in its successful operation; and to
require that the city should be compelled to pay these parties, or
any one of them, who may have been appointed by the council to
discharge certain duties, when the department itself had been abolished, would be to hold that the mere appointment was in the nature
of a hiring from year to year, and the corporation compelled to
maintain the department fortie two years; or, if not, to pay the
officers appointed to operate it their full salaries, whether any
services were rendered or not. The services to be rendered in this
case were not professional or private, but official and public.
"Although an officer may be elected or appointed for h fixed period,
yet where he is not bound and cannot be compelled to serve for the
whole time, such election or appointment cannot be considered a
contract to hire for a stipulated term :" Dillon on Corps., p. 204;
Iowa Cty v. Poster,10 Iowa 189; Connor v. Mayor of New York,
1 Seld. 285; Hfoboken v. Gear, 3 Dutch. 26 ; Wheatly v. City of
Covington, 11 Bush. 18.
The couficil in organizing the fire department created the office
of ehief of the department, fixed the term at two years, and appointed the appellant Williams. This was not a contest between
the city and appellant, nor was it obligatory on the latter to serve
the two years.
The court below having so decided, the judgment is affirmed.

